Notes from First Warning Working Group Meeting - 5 October 1978

#### Attendees:

DIA Peter C. Oleson, OSD/DoD Robert H. Baraz, State Theodore G. Shackley, AD/DCI/CT CIA Richard Lehman, NIO/Warning

Main topic: Charter for NFIB Consideration

# Functions of NFIB Committee and Working Group

Oleson - OSD viewpoint

- 1. Square 1 with this subject.
- 2. What exists is not adequate; field is open.
- 3. Management structure should be feasible.
- 4. Working arrangements should be within the Community as it now exists.

#### Lehman

- 1. Wire existing systems together rather than to create new things.
- 1. Seconds Lehman's statement.
- Spend time talking about objectives. Big W and little w. Who should be involved with it.

#### Lehman

- Spectrum from "w" to strategic pact warning means avoidance of surprise on anything that matters.
- 2. Responsibility for all intelligence organizations.

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- 3. Soviets #1 priority for all intelligence organizations.
- 4. Cannot be exclusive responsibility of any one organization.
- 5. Broad objective is to find ways of using line organizations to focus on the entire range of warning problems but making the move across the spectrum smooth and making sure that all elements are in sinc with the I&W systems that are devoted to military attack.
- 6. Problem: How do you mary the contributions os State and CIA in in particular on the political and economic side with the military accountables?

## 01eson

- 1. Define to a certain degree what are our responsibilities for warning. Has been done in the Defense Department, but not very well at CIA because of a broader spectrum at CIA.
- 2. Broad spectrum is not responsibility of <u>all</u> organizations.
- 3. Edges need to be cleaned up. (Handout from Oleson).

# Response to Comments and Criticisms of Carlucci on J-2

#### Basic thoughts:

- 1. We shouldn't create a bureaucracy.
  - a. Use existing mechanisms.
  - b. Tie them together to fulfill responsibilities.
- 2. Disadvantage to NIO for Warning
  - a. DCID 1/5 was better approach to problem.
  - b. Murphy agrees and is discussing with Brown. This should be discussed thoroughly.

## (Other Oleson sheet)

- 3. NIO for Warning 2 responsibilities:
  - a. Substantive function
  - b. Process of warning within the Community

- 1) Should be able to task analyses throughout Community.
- 2) Same responsibilities as various committee chairmen.
  - a) Assess process Community-wide and recommend changes.
  - b) Interface with Gen. Camm's group when necessary. To
  - c)\_/assist in the procedural aspects, there should be a working group and not an NFIB subcommittee. Coordinating group from various agencies.
  - d) NFAC's focus is really "w" as opposed to "W".
  - e) NIO's structure is appropriate
  - f) SWS (NIOs?) focused on "W".
  - g) DIA has both substantive and procedural responsibilities; should not change. Functioning well and having plan for improving.
  - h) No opinion on State.
  - i) NSA should be involved because of SIGINT importance.
- 1. Substantive responsibilities are impossibility. Cannot be delegated to any particular person.
- 2. We are trying to develop a management structure which will free up the warning structure. Should not read as DCID 1/5 does now. Has to concentrate on procedures.
- 3. Give to NFIB or subcommittee. Should not argued at any lower level.
- 4. DCID 1/5 should be used as the means by which:
  - a. Staff what we are doing.
  - b. DCI puts out in official fashion his organization for strategic warning and its focal point.
- 5. What are the functions of NIO/W?
  - a. NIO structured for "w" function; needs discipline; someone to provide guidance, incentives, formats, checkpoints so that each one knows his responsibility.
  - b. Encouraging issuance of warning.
  - c. Providing interface between Ops Centers in the Community -need 2-3 man staff to do so.

- 6. No large staff.
- 7. Crisis management: should not be involved in at all.

## Lehman

- 1. DCID 1/5 has got to be rewritten. Product a paper for this.
- 2. Procedural "before the fact" aspects of intelligence support to crisis management. Don't have to put this on the top of the agenda.

# Shackley

1. We should all agree to leave crisis management out for the time being and focus on I&W.

1. Use House Committee questions as backdrop for procedures to be discussed. January 15 deadline for House Committee questions.

#### Baraz

- 1. Does not like DCID 1/5.
- 2. Go back to Watch Committee structure?
- 3. How much sybstance should be mixed with management and vice versa?
- 4. Rewriting DCID is necessary. Get some drafting started here, but maybe should be done after some shaking down has taken place. Interim report by January 15 rather than finished DCID.
- 5. "W" and "w" -- clear that the mission of NIO and working group will take in much more than "W". It is desirable:
  - a. "W" function when divorced from some of the crises which might lead to it and the crises in the real world tends to get apparent(?).
  - b. Make use of the techniques of I&W more effective in the areas of third world conflicts.
  - Define problems in which indications will do some good.
    Cannot try to warn every conceivable thing.
  - d. Separation between SWS and NIOs creates problem when they should be interacting.

1. DCI's position should be to draw upon that intelligence that is available. Task seems to be smaller than others have indicated.

## 01eson

1. Impedence should be guarded against.

ГАТ

1. Subcommittee of the NFIB is not necessary. Should be the NFIB as a whole for review procedures.

Lehman - More consensus than might appear initially.

- Procedural role is using the working group to do the sorts of things that are talked about in paper.
- Substantive role is the conscience of the Community with regard to the substance of warning.
  - In the real world, should be a "needler."
  - On occasion, advise DCI that he ought to convey to the national authorities his view that something is going on. May or may not want to discuss at NFIB.
- Freeing up the system agree. We do not want a committee structure between the message coming from below and the people who need the warning.
- 4. Should not create a coordinated warning document at all costs.
- Need in Community (CIA and State) (DoD system is solid and does job). No discipline exists. Challenge exists in ad hoc fashion. That discipline can be provided through the NIOs. My role is to try to find a way of bringing the military structure and discipline together with the civilian side at the national level.
- Question of SWS and what it should do needs a very careful look. We need some study of that and fairly soon.
- Desire agreement on location of my job. DCI decided that he wanted to have it within NFAC. As far as procedural aspects of the job. I will be working for the DCI. Substantive aspects, I will be working as any other NIO would. Murphy and J-2's feel far the opposite way. (Murphy is talking to Brown tomorrow afternoon).

## Oleson

- 1. Murphy has a few preliminary thoughts.
- 2. Buried in the NFAC structure will be a distinct disadvantage.

## **Shackley**

- 1. Functioning as ombudsman and have a catalytic role.
- 2. Should be given freedom in the system.
- 3. Working in NFIB context(?) offers you protection and freedom of play within the national field.
- 4. I&W is primarily analytical area. You should be in NFAC area but should report to DCI or DDCI.



- 1. You should be reporting to Carlucci.
- 2. Problem stems from the concept of NFAC. Is not really "Community" organization although it advertises itself as such.
- 3. Attached to NFAC for administrative purposes; organizationally should be with Carlucci.

#### Baraz

- Can report to DDCI or Bowie.
- 2. Shares concern about what NFAC means.
- 3. This is the DCI in his Community hat.

AT \_\_\_\_\_

- Other organizations would be more responsive if you were special assistant.
- 2. I am confortable with either judgment.

AT

1. No very strong feeling. Your function is a little different from other NIOs. Should be receiving input from NIOs and other people. Therefore should not be lined up with other NIOs.

## Lehman

Changed title without changing pecking order.

## 01eson

1. NIO title is handicap to you.

## Lehman

1. This is a national function.

#### Baraz.

1. Bothered by national idiom of other NIOs.

## 01eson

1. Does not deal in substantive world the same as Robertson does. He perceives the role as more important procedurally than substantively. Warning will not originate with him.

# Shackley

1. Cannot exclude that it cannot originate with him.

#### 01eson

1. Probably will not.

#### Alert Memo Discussion

#### Oleson

1. NIO should not be able to put the damper on anyone else issuing warning other than himself.

#### Lehman

1. Tighe warns in DoD. If something came that way that the DCI does not know about, he would ask NIO/W what position he should take. Would hope that the decision as to whether the national authority should be alerted would be done by the DCI in coordination with Tighe and others as appropriate.

## NFIB-Level Committee

#### Lehman

- 1. Concept is that the DDCI is the only place short of the DCI where all these things come together.
- 2. Problem is important enough for DDCI to take on.
- 3. Precedent set in previous DDCI's chairing Watch Committee.
- 4. Carlucci does not expect to spend too much time on this.
- He also feels the need for some kind of body to work with. He has in mind certain NFIB principles. Keep it small. The product of the working group (in substance) will be brought to this committee for a kind of ratification. He has no fixed idea bout this at all. Is open to suggestion.

## 01eson

- What kinds of issues are that group of people going to have to deal with?
- 2. What would this group of principals have to deal with?

- 1. Change the CRITIC system.
- 2. May not warrant the creation of such an organization.

## Lehman

Revised indicator list being brought to NFIB. This action could take place within this forum.

Oleson - Disagrees - FBI would be involved. Maybe Treasury.

- 1. Bad precedent
- Would not limit it to a subcommittee.

Requires judgment that is just as important as a judgment on a substantive intelligence estimate.

## Baraz

- 1. Carlucci is looking for a ceremonial function.
- 2. Monthly report from NIO/W.
- 3. FBI can play some role in the process.

## Oleson

1. And maybe Treasury.

## Baraz

1. Open-ended committee? Remain if you choose to.

## Lehman

- 1. What we are really talking about is NFIB with DDCI in the chair.
- 2. Should not be a regular exercise for NFIB. Should not review a weekly warning report.
- 3. Resolve question of where I sit first.
- 4. Draft very first crack of "Son of DCID 1/5".
- 5. Next meeting 2:00 p.m. Friday, 13 October.

# <u>Oleson</u>

- 1. Bring checklist of issues that we should impress.
- 2. Statement of existing responsibilities and functions.

Drop existing responsibilities and functions ideas.

#### Lehman

- 1. List of what you should expect this organization to do for you.
- 2. What problems do you want to bring to the working group?
- 3. What problems do you want to bring to me as "X" for Warning?

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- 4. Should we take a look at the SWS function?
- 5. DIA should take the lead in study on SWS.